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Abstract 
With the development of forensic sciences during the 20th century, macro-scaled 
empirical relations were supplemented with micro- and submicro-scaled prob-
ability relations. High sensitivity analysis methods imposed increasingly strin-
gent criteria on the science of individualization. This process even labelled those 
traditional forensic sciences junks, which rely heavily on an indefinable set of 
characteristics in order to achieve individuality. However, this has not led to a 
systematic change in the judicial interpretation of expert evidence. In this paper 
I will therefore address the theoretical question: What logic lies behind forensic 
identity? In order to answer this question, I conducted explanatory research in the 
fields of forensics, criminal law, philosophy and logic. Following the collection 
and interpretation of qualitative data, such as the relevant literature, legislation 
and case law, I came to the conclusion that fuzzy logic lies behind forensic identity.
Keywords: forensic identification, individualization, identity, fuzzy logic, phi-
losophy
Introduction
Forensic sciences support criminal law by providing general principled solu-
tions for scientific questions that arise during the criminal procedure (Chisum 
et al., 2011, 4.). In practice, the forensic expert is the person who presents this 
knowledge on a scientific level before the authorities (Alapy, 1930, 264.). His/
her task is often aimed at forensic identification, that is to individualize the link 
between two or more objects (Kertész, 1972, 326.). However, following formal 
logic, the fact that forensic experts preliminarily analyze, compare and evaluate 
objects arisen, collected and managed under various conditions, make source 
1   This research was funded by ÚNKP-19-3-III-SZE-8 New National Excellence Program of the Ministry 
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conclusions contradictory (Angyal, 2016, 11.). In this paper I will therefore ad-
dress the theoretical question: What kind of logic lies behind forensic identity? 
The answer to this question is of methodological importance in the field of foren-
sics (Viski, 1960, 75.). Namely, because the logic behind forensic identity high-
lights those axioms, that forensic disciplines are supposed to describe through 
the exploration of causal mechanisms. The task of forensic scientists, on the oth-
er hand, is considerably complicated by the fact that the axioms in question are 
theoretical cornerstones that cannot be proved or refuted by complete induction 
(Katona, 2002, 158.).
Materials and methods
In order to extend the theory of forensic identification, I conducted explanatory 
research in the fields of forensics, criminal law, philosophy and logic. In doing 
so, I was determined to explore the logic behind forensic identity. Following 
the collection and interpretation of qualitative data, such as relevant literature, 
legislation and case law, I established the causal link between forensic identi-
fication and fuzzy set theory.
Results
Forensic- or criminalistic identification? Identical or non-identical?
The term forensic sciences began to be used in states under Anglo-Saxon legal 
systems to denote and systematize the auxiliary sciences of criminal- and, later, 
civil justice (Chisum et al., 2011, 4.). On the contrary, in continental legal sys-
tems, this body of knowledge has been conceptualized as criminalistic technique 
(Viski, 1960, 70.). However, my question on scientific terminology and system-
atization has still not been answered. The situation is further complicated by the 
fact that the concept of criminalistics is used as a branch of forensic sciences by 
Anglo-Saxon authors, namely: trace evidence (Chisum et al., 2011, 5.), while 
continental European authors usually refer to it as a discipline that includes in-
vestigative acts as well as techniques (Fenyvesi, 2017, 23.). Different meaning 
in these linguistic areas can therefore be associated with forensic and criminal-
istic identification. The most glaring example of this is that, in continental Eu-
ropean legal systems, criminalistic identification can not only be performed by 
an expert who has acquired the scientific knowledge of the given forensic field, 
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but even by lay persons (e.g. investigators and witnesses) (Kertész, 1972, 318.). 
The differential specificity of forensic identification is therefore best reflected 
in both legal systems by the concept of expert evidence. However, the practi-
cal task of forensic identification can only be performed on strong theoretical 
foundations (Alapy, 1930, 264.). The current differentiation and specialization 
of forensic sciences is threatening with atomization. In order to counteract this, 
criminalists need to explore continually the connection between forensic dis-
ciplines. The systematization of forensic sciences by internal contexts not only 
provides a clear overview, but also strengthens the collaboration between the 
practitioners of these various fields (Fogarasi, 1958, 414.). Whether it is foren-
sic science in the Anglo-Saxon sense or criminalistics in the continental Euro-
pean sense, one thing is for certain: their first and most important disciplinary 
level issue is the identity of identity and non-identity.
The identity of identity and non-identity
Ontology or epistemology?
What is the relationship between the material world and human consciousness? 
This is the principal issue of philosophy, firstly because it embraces the two 
extreme poles of the world – namely, material and spiritual phenomena – and 
secondly because it is challenging the person to master reality over and over 
again. In answering this question, philosophers split into two groups. Idealists 
are made up of those who think that the spirit is inherent, while materialists 
are made up of those who think that the nature is inherent (Szigeti, 1984, 111.). 
The problem of the relationship between matter and idea implicitly includes 
the issue of cognition in addition to the issue of primacy. Namely: How does 
the cognitive being become acquainted with, or can he/she become acquainted 
with the world at all? At first glance, it may seem that answering this question 
is necessary for deciding the issue of primacy. Because, in order to take a stand 
on the material or spiritual definiteness of the world, we must first ascertain 
whether the world can be known, and whether our cognition is really a cogni-
tion, not some sort of illusion. However, denying the possibility of cognition 
is in itself cognition, as well as asserting it, after all, they both count on being 
accepted as the general truth (Szigeti, 1984, 111.). Consequently, the more we 
deny the existence of truth, the more we consider true the proposition that there 
is no truth. By denying the truth abstractly, we are directly stating the truth. If 
our content-asserted theorem (no truth) becomes complete certainty, then the 
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form (proven truth) necessarily devalues the content: if the form does not prove 
it, then the content cannot become a universal truth either. The question of cog-
nition cannot therefore be regarded as prior to the question of primacy. Other-
wise, we end up in a paralogism in which the form and the content mutually 
devalue each other (Szigeti, 1984, 112.). In this way, the main side of the es-
sential philosophical question is not the epistemological side, but the ontologi-
cal side. Especially because the cognitive being first had to become acquainted 
with the world to some extent in order to make the nature of cognition his/her 
research object based on his/her accumulated experience. The question of the 
possibility of cognition therefore necessarily presupposes research into the na-
ture of the world (Szigeti, 1984, 113.). The same holds true for the process of 
forensic identification: understanding the unique relationship of the reference 
objects necessarily presupposes research into the nature of the source object.
Formal or dialectical logic?
Following formal logic, the fact that forensic experts preliminarily analyze, com-
pare and evaluate objects arisen, collected and managed under various condi-
tions, make source conclusions contradictory (Angyal, 2016, 11.). After all, the 
traditional formal logical principle of contradiction is defined by Aristotle as fol-
lows: ʻIt is not possible for the same thing at the same time both to belong and 
not to belong to the same thing in the same respect’ (Aristoteles, 1936, 101.). 
This principle, on the other hand, can be applied solely and exclusively to cases 
where the question is whether or not a concept, as a subject, really belongs to a 
predicate. In particular, in the case of the identity or non-identity of reference 
characteristics, two contradictory claims cannot be true together, because ʻ some-
thing is either A or not-A; there is no third’ (Hegel, 1979-B, 50.). The logical 
roots of the theory of forensic identification are therefore to be found in philo-
sophical dialectics. The ancient type of philosophical dialectics is the Greek de-
velopmental dialectic and the accompanying emanational dialectic, which can be 
considered naïve only in the sense that they did not, and for the most part could 
not, rely on scientific data or theories, which also explains their spontaneity. As 
representatives of developmental dialectics in the 6th century BC, Anaximenes 
and Heraclitus were already drawing attention to phenomena such as the trans-
formation of quantitative changes into qualitative difference and to contradic-
tion as the driving force of movement and development (Szigeti, 1984, 506.). 
Although Plato did not completely break with this tradition, a new, rather prob-
lematic, historical type of dialectic, the emanational dialectic, began with him, 
which reverted the developmental process. What used to go from the simple to 
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the complex (bottom-up determination) has now moved from the richest idea-
tional being to the material element considered as the most basic and treated as a 
by-product of the ideational existence (top-down determination) (Szigeti, 1984, 
507.). The emanation character that prevailed in medieval development greatly 
contributed to the degradation of dialectic among the representatives of the new 
age. However, not all emanations are dialectic just as not all dialectics are ema-
national. This is why, at the beginning of the new age, philosophers with signifi-
cant materialistic orientation reintroduced the elements of emanational dialectic 
into the materialist developmental dialectic. This was, for example, the case of 
Bruno and Leibniz, who have criticised the theorems of their idealistic forerun-
ner, Cusa (Szigeti, 1984, 510.). According to Cusa, the last significant thinker 
of the Middle Ages and the first of the New Age: ʻthe universe is trine, that of 
all things there is none which is not one from possibility, actuality, and uniting 
motion, and that none of these three can at all exist without the other two, so 
that of necessity these three are present in all things according to very different 
degrees. They are present so differently that no two things in the universe can 
be altogether equal with respect to any one of them’ (Cusanus, 1999, 122-123.). 
Therefore, if ascending or descending the scale of numbers, we actually arrive 
at a maximum or minimum: still we do not come to an actual maximum or min-
imum number to which there can be no greater or smaller number. However, ac-
tuality cannot be defined as a number: it is the beginning of all numbers because 
it is the minimum; and it is the end of all numbers, because it is the maximum. 
We cannot reach the actual minimum or maximum number, because the oppo-
sites coincide through their uniting motion (Cusanus, 1999, 16.). Although the 
first thesis that follows from the principle of Cusa’s coincidence of opposites is 
the right conclusion that the universe is infinite but also the false conclusion that 
the universe is unstructured. The emanational aspect is thus a limitation of dia-
lectic, since the starting point of the upper ideational determination does not al-
low it to unfold (Szigeti, 1984, 509.). The real change was brought about by the 
principle of ʻ the identity of identity and non-identity’ (Hegel, 1979-A, 50.), with 
which developmental dialectic has reached the point at which it can be reached 
on idealistic ground. Hegel’s logic is also ontology, in which the emphasis is 
no longer on the coincidence of opposites, but on the unity of opposites. The 
mutually exclusive poles do not coincide in abstract identity without difference 
because the unity maintains them in their relative autonomy. Concrete identity 
not only bears the moment of negation externally, but also internally, by deny-
ing the independence of its own elements, into a new, synthetic unity. The phe-
nomena (unity) of the material world are not only identical (specificity) but also 
non-identical (generality) with themselves (A=Ā) (Szigeti, 1998, 468.). In this 
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dialectic unity of contradictory and contrary oppositions, however, there is al-
ways a degree of uncertainty in the solution of which the basic idea of fuzzy sets 
seems to be unfolding (Mészáros et al., 1986, 487.).
A solvable or unsolvable residual problem?
The categories of unity, specificity and generality are the material definitions of 
reality (the degrees of determination) which the sciences are meant to describe 
in an object-specific way (Szigeti, 1984, 198.). Thus, forensic sciences cannot 
be indifferent to answering the question: What is the quantitative (specificity) 
limit of the qualitative (generality) changes in the characteristics of the source 
object (unity)? Concerning this question, material ontology designates that the 
generality () of the source object () is the logical basis which succinctly and 
necessarily defines the inherent content of the trace: which source object could 
have left the specific trace. However, not just any kind of source object, but the 
ones within the ʻfuzzy set’ justified by the competent forensic discipline. Ac-
cording to Zadeh, the founding father of fuzzy logic: ʻA fuzzy set is a class of 
objects with a continuum of grades of membership. […] the notion of a fuzzy 
set provides a convenient point of departure for the construction of a concep-
tual framework which […] provides a natural way of dealing with problems 
in which the source of imprecision is the absence of sharply defined criteria of 
class membership rather than the presence of random variables’ (Zadeh, 1965, 
338-339.). Given that forensic sciences do not operate by coincidences but by 
the rule of axioms, fuzzy set theory can be particularly suitable for solving the 
residual problem of individualization. In the development of forensic scienc-
es, it can be shown that the use of more advanced tools reduces uncertainty but 
does not completely eliminate it. Forensic sciences have always operated with 
a degree of uncertainty. With the expansion of the scientific horizon, they are 
now able to say even more what the scope of uncertainty is. The latter, how-
ever, should not be seen as an unsolvable residual problem. On the contrary, 
we must acknowledge positional irrationality in the process of individualiza-
tion: ʻphenomena that are difficult to access in terms of cognition but can still 
be grasped and managed conceptually and practically in terms of the overall 
process’ (Szigeti, 1991, 13-14.). The residual in this way is not unknowable but 
is not yet known at the given stage of development. At this point, it is worth 
recalling and applying Hartmann’s theory to my research topic, according to 
which human thinking tends to extend goal-means associations to circles of re-
ality where we cannot talk about purposeful activity. Behind this naïve anthro-
pomorphism is human inertia towards nature, which can only be traced through 
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scientific thinking: ʻ most of the time, one understands very well that coincidence 
could not have happened otherwise, but the realization of causal necessity is 
only a step away from this. But it is precisely this blind necessity that happens 
unexpectedly’ (Hartmann, 1970, 64.). However, the concept of coincidence can 
only be defined in terms of its opposite, of necessity, which cannot manifest it-
self in isolation, but in a multitude of events.
The fuzzy set of forensic identity
As the mathematical formalism of probability calculation offers a numerical 
measure for the nomothetic interpretation of mass-scale events, the question is 
increasingly being asked in the field of criminal procedure based on idiographic 
approach: How unique is unique? For traditional forensic sciences (research-
ing morphological characteristics), the theory of dactyloscopic identification 
served as a methodological model: regarding the quality of the source object, 
the link between the characteristics of the reference objects is unique as long as 
the quantitative difference of the latter does not show a change to an extent that 
would lead to a qualitative transformation of the source object (Faulds, 1905, 
53.). However, there are also qualitative transformations in scientific cognition, 
as a result of which it reveals increasingly more differences where it has previ-
ously seen identity before (Fogarasi, 1958, 57.). With the development of fo-
rensic sciences during the 20th century, macro-scaled empirical relations were 
supplemented with micro- and submicro-scaled probability relations (Katona, 
2002, 168.). High sensitivity analysis methods imposed increasingly stringent 
criteria on the science of individualization: the general acceptance of the giv-
en method was replaced by the criterion of methodological reliability placing 
the Bayesian approach in the forefront of forensics (Broeders, 2014, 3513.). 
This process even labelled those traditional forensic sciences junks, which rely 
heavily on an indefinable set of characteristics in order to achieve individuali-
ty: ʻNo basis exists in theory or data for the core contention that every distinct 
object leaves its own unique set of markers that can be identified by a skilled 
forensic scientist. Their claims exaggerate the state of their science. This sort 
of exaggeration, combined with public credulity, is the classic reason that com-
mon law evidence doctrine required a heightened threshold for admission of 
expert testimony. […] Forensic identification scientists can help themselves im-
mediately by forswearing exaggerated, definitive conclusions in favor of hum-
bler, scientifically justifiable, and probabilistic conclusions’ (Saks et al., 2008, 
218-219.). Saks and Koehler, as well as criminalists who promote the fallacy 
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of individualization, ignore the fact that practice always verifies the scientific 
result. The ontological nature of the theory of dactyloscopic identification is 
proved by the fact that its axioms have retained their validity even in the midst 
of scientific and technical changes. Nothing proves this better than the case law 
of the United States: ʻBecause of its focus on methodological rigor, many tort 
reformers trumpet the Daubert standards as a way to get rid of junk science in 
the courtroom. […] In this more comprehensive analysis, we too find very lit-
tle evidence that adoption of the Daubert trilogy has any systematic effect on 
whom is offered as an expert in state court disputes. […] we cannot determine 
exactly why Daubert seems to have no systematic effect’ (Helland et al., 2012, 
32-33.). The answer lies in the fuzzy logic behind forensic identity. In the field 
of forensics, mathematical logic did not make logic out of mathematics, but 
made mathematics out of logic: some of the objects and methods of forensic 
identification provide an opportunity to quantify the frequency distribution of 
characteristics, while others ʻ do not constitute classes or sets in the usual math-
ematical sense […] Yet, the fact remains that such imprecisely defined ‘classes’ 
play an important role in human thinking, particularly in the domains of pat-
tern recognition’ (Zadeh, 1965, 339.). Therefore, it is now a common criticism 
of the Bayesian approach that it requires such numerical prior probability val-
ues that are quite difficult, time-consuming, expensive, or merely impossible 
to determine experimentally (Halliwell et al., 2003, 42.).
In practice, it is often unavoidable to use subjective probability estimates pub-
lished by experts. According to the United States National Research Council: 
ʻthere is an equally important responsibility not to use numbers, which convey the 
impression of precision, when the understanding of relationships is indeed less 
secure. Thus, whilst quantitative risk assessment facilitates comparison, such 
comparison may be illusory or misleading if the use of precise numbers is unjus-
tified’ (National Research Council, 1981, 15.). Various studies have pointed out 
that while point estimates of probability expressions are highly variable among 
subjects, probabilistic uncertainty, expressed in verbal form, can provide more 
accurate estimates of the frequency of multiple characteristics (Halliwell et al., 
2003, 43.). All this suggests is that: it would be useful to include probabilistic 
expressions in forensic probabilistic models. Foucault shed light on the above 
problem, saying that there are many areas in society, especially criminal justice, 
ʻwhere truth is formed, where a certain number of ground rules are defined – certain 
ground rules of subjectivity, subject areas, knowledge types – and consequently, 
if we take them into account, we can create the external story of truth’ (Foucault, 
1998, 8.). However, we must not forget that practice is the final test of the applied 
scientific results (Hartmann, 1970, 134.). After all, in addition to the certainty of 
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uncertainties, it is for the trier of fact to determine the probative value of expert 
evidence by comparing it with other data and evidence available in the case in 
question. This is how subjective elements take place in jurisprudence. Although 
positive law seeks to eliminate this subjectivity, criminal justice is also looking 
for certainty somewhere in the midst of uncertainty: the best possible solution 
available at a given degree; because the only one correct decision does not exist, 
only the one which is the most authoritative in the given conditions of the given 
age, both factually and legally. The concepts of morphological and substantive 
trace should therefore not be mechanically separated. Their separation is based 
on their information content relevant to the given case: if it is a reflected formal 
feature, we are talking about a morphological trace, and if it is a material feature, 
then we are talking about a substantial trace (residue material) (Kertész, 1973, 12.). 
The emphasis here is not on the fact that substantial traces represent the source 
object beside themselves because, even if we know the material properties of the 
source object, there are no reference materials that could be used to draw a con-
clusion about the individuality of the link between characteristics based on their 
quantitative and qualitative assessment. This is the objective dialectic relation-
ship, the importance of which Locard has drawn to the attention of the forensic 
community during the discussion of the principle of mutual exchange (Locard, 
1923, 80.). While it is true that, in the case of mutual exchange, it is possible to 
examine the individuality of the link between characteristics in the opposite di-
rection, it must necessarily be preceded by the traditional approach of forensic 
identification. We can obviously go there and come back on the same route, but 
first we have to go there; in order to come back. The unique characteristics of the 
source object are constantly changing as a result of various circumstances, the 
process of which is interrupted by the stages of relative constancy that enable 
identification (Katona, 2002, 147.). Consequently, in order to be able to draw a 
source conclusion regarding a specific trace, we must first become familiar with 
the genus proximum of the source object nomothetically: that is the fuzzy set of 
its possibilities of change. Consequently, only in this way are we able to decide 
whether ʻx does or does not belong to A’ (Zadeh, 1965, 339.).
Conclusions and discussion
In the present study, I sought to answer the question of the logic by which the 
theory of forensic identification can solve the contradiction that arises from 
the individualization of the link between two or more individual phenomena. 
After conducting explanatory research in the fields of forensics, criminal law, 
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philosophy and logic, I have come to the conclusion that fuzzy logic lies be-
hind forensic identity.
The results of my research have methodological importance, which enriches the 
theory of forensic identification with the following knowledge:
• Given the differentiation of the Anglo-Saxon and European continental le-
gal systems, expert evidence is the differentia specifica of forensic scienc-
es, to which the theory of identification is given an independent discipli-
nary character.
• The question of cognition cannot be regarded as prior to the question of pri-
macy regarding the theory of forensic identification: because understanding 
the unique relationship of the reference objects necessarily presupposes re-
search into the nature of the source object.
• The ontology of forensic identification is rooted in the ancient Greek devel-
opmental dialectic, which medieval emanational limit Hegel, following the 
footsteps of Cusa, was able to overcome by the thesis of the identity of iden-
tity and non-identity, from which the basic idea of fuzzy sets has unfolded.
• In the development of forensic sciences, it can be shown that the use of 
more advanced tools reduces uncertainty but does not completely elimi-
nate it. The resulting residual problem can be solved if we acknowledge 
positional irrationality in the process of individualization, namely that the 
residual in this way is not unknowable but is not yet known at the given 
stage of development.
• The theory of dactyloscopic identification has an ontological instead of a 
pseudo-scientific nature because its axioms have retained their validity even 
in the midst of scientific and technical changes. This is due to the fact that 
the unique characteristics of the source object form a fuzzy set.
• The concepts of morphological and substantive trace should not be mechan-
ically separated in the field of forensics. Although both contain subjective 
elements, they can provide relevant information for the case in question.
• Criminal justice is an area in society, where practice checks the results of 
the applied forensic sciences by comparing it with other data and evidence 
available in the case in question.
The theses listed above form a theoretical bridge between the field of forensic 
identification and fuzzy set theory, and at the same time justify the influence of 
fuzzy approaches in forensic data analysis. The vision of forensic identification 
points in the direction of fuzzy expert systems.
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